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INTRODUCTION 
At first glance, patent law might seem the least likely place 
to look for Judge Richard Posner’s impact on the law. Judge  
Posner was appointed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals on 
October 27, 1981. On October 1, 1982, Congress created the  
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals and vested it with responsibility 
for deciding all patent law appeals.1 Thus, for all but one year of 
his thirty-five-year career, Judge Posner’s court did not decide a 
single patent case. 
Yet as anyone participating in this Symposium knows well, 
Judge Posner was rarely constrained by the strictures of his own 
court. Beginning in 2003, Judge Posner took a strong interest in 
patent law and began sitting by designation on courts that han-
dled patent cases.2 For the most part, this meant the Northern 
District of Illinois, located in the same federal building in Chicago 
as Posner’s Seventh Circuit. Many of these cases settled—two of 
them in my clerkship year (2003–2004) alone. Yet Posner’s inter-
est in finding compelling patent cases was such that he would not 
be deterred. Over the next decade, Posner presided over numer-
ous patent trials and wrote twenty-nine opinions in patent cases, 
a volume of patent law output just as high as many of the regular 
members of the Northern District. In addition, Posner sat by des-
ignation on the Federal Circuit in 2009. He wrote just a single 
opinion, Ritchie v Vast Resources, Inc,3 but that lone opinion has 
quickly become a staple of patent law casebooks and one of the 
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 1 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 § 127(a), Pub L No 97-164, 96 Stat 25, 
37–38, codified at 28 USC § 1295. 
 2 The first patent case in which Posner sat by designation was SmithKline Beecham 
Corp v Apotex Corp, 247 F Supp 2d 1011 (ND Ill 2003). 
 3 563 F3d 1334 (Fed Cir 2009). 
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more memorable patent opinions in existence.4 All told, Posner 
has had as much of an impact on patent law as judges who have 
focused on that field throughout their entire careers. And he has 
managed to exert this influence despite writing only one patent 
opinion as an appellate judge, having decided the other cases in 
his capacity as a district court judge. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, Posner’s influence on patent law 
has come through his application (and in some cases nonapplica-
tion) of economic principles to the law. Patent law, as made 
through the courts, has frequently lagged behind other areas of 
law in its application of economics.5 Posner’s involvement has 
thus represented an important perturbation from outside of the 
field. 
Judge Posner’s methodological influence on patent law is 
most visible in three cases, covering three distinct areas of law. 
The first is Asahi Glass Co v Pentech Pharmaceuticals, Inc,6 which 
concerns the interaction between patent law and antitrust. The 
second is Ritchie, a case on the law of obviousness and Posner’s 
lone Federal Circuit opinion. And the third is Apple, Inc v 
Motorola, Inc,7 a case about patent damages. The Federal Circuit 
actually reversed Posner in Apple v Motorola,8 but that has not 
stopped his opinion from serving as the touchstone of an entire 
movement in the law of patents.9 These opinions tell the story of 
a judicial polymath who descended on a new field (to him), found 
it wanting, and set about correcting it. 
 
 4 See Robert Patrick Merges and John Fitzgerald Duffy, Patent Law and Policy: 
Cases and Materials 681–82 (LexisNexis 6th ed 2013). 
 5 See Jason B. Portis, Through the Alice Corp. Looking Glass: Using Pragmatic  
Arguments to Bring Predictability to Patent Law, 14 Nw J Tech & Intell Prop 237, 253–54 
(2016) (arguing that the Federal Circuit has been too formalistic about patent law and 
that pragmatic considerations, like economics, will lead to more precise results); Peter Lee, 
Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 Yale L J 2, 27 (2010) (criticizing the Federal Circuit 
for rarely citing economic scholarship, unlike the approaches of several other appellate 
courts). 
 6 289 F Supp 2d 986 (ND Ill 2003). 
 7 869 F Supp 2d 901 (ND Ill 2012). 
 8 757 F3d 1286 (Fed Cir 2014). 
 9 See Part III; Patrick Doll and L. Joseph Denbina, Daubert for “Dummkopfs”—
Judge Posner Hypothetically Disparages Patent Damages Experts in Apple and Brandeis, 
21 Tex Intell Prop L J 301, 336–42 (2013) (prophesizing the effect of Posner’s decision on 
patent law). 
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I.  ASAHI GLASS V PENTECH PHARMACEUTICALS 
Judge Posner’s most significant contribution to patent law 
arose from what appeared to be a run-of-the-mill dispute between 
brand-name and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers. In 2000, 
SmithKline Beecham Corp sued Pentech, a generic pharmaceuti-
cal firm, claiming that Pentech had infringed SmithKline’s drug 
patent. The two parties settled out of court, pursuant to what 
might have struck a casual observer as a peculiar arrangement: 
Pentech would be permitted to sell its generic version of 
SmithKline’s drug only in Puerto Rico.10 It could not enter the re-
maining US market unless SmithKline’s patent was invalidated 
or held not to be infringed in separate litigation against another 
pharmaceutical manufacturer. SmithKline also agreed to provide 
Pentech with an unlimited supply of the drug free of charge, 
though Pentech was required to pay SmithKline a “hefty royalty 
on Pentech’s sales of the drug.”11 
Asahi had been a supplier of raw materials to Pentech in its 
manufacture of the drug involved in the lawsuit.12 After the 
SmithKline-Pentech settlement, Pentech no longer had any rea-
son to purchase anything from Asahi because it was receiving the 
drug for free from SmithKline. In response, Asahi brought suit 
against both Pentech and GlaxoSmithKline,13 accusing them of 
having colluded (via the settlement) to divide the market for the 
drug in violation of the antitrust laws.14 It is perhaps unsurpris-
ing that this case, which represents Posner’s most significant con-
tribution to patent law, concerns the interaction between that 
body of law and a doctrinal area at the core of Posner’s expertise: 
antitrust. The intersection of patent and antitrust is a particu-
larly difficult and complex subject because of the competing pur-
poses of those bodies of law. Antitrust law exists to eliminate re-
straints on trade (including monopolies) in order to encourage 
competition; patent law explicitly authorizes firms to establish 
 
 10 See SmithKline Beecham Corp v Pentech Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 261 F Supp 2d 
1002, 1004 (ND Ill 2003). 
 11 Asahi, 289 F Supp 2d at 989. 
 12 See SmithKline Beecham, 261 F Supp 2d at 1004. 
 13 When Pentech and SmithKline Beecham Corp v Apotex Corp, 247 F Supp 2d 1011 
(ND Ill 2003) (Apotex), were filed, SmithKline Beecham Corp had not yet merged with 
Glaxo Wellcome. However, after those two filings, and before Asahi was filed, Glaxo  
Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham Corp merged to become GlaxoSmithKline PLC. Thus, 
when referring to the entity in the Pentech and Apotex cases, this piece uses “SmithKline.” 
However, when referring to the entity in Asahi, this piece uses “GlaxoSmithKline.” 
 14 Asahi, 289 F Supp 2d at 990. 
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state-sponsored monopolies (and thus suppress competition) for 
the purpose of encouraging innovation. A panoply of actions that 
firms take pursuant to patent rights are anticompetitive, by de-
sign. When a firm alleges that a patent holder has used a patent 
in violation of the antitrust laws, a court must determine whether 
the patent holder’s actions, even if anticompetitive, fall outside of 
the ambit of what patent law allows. 
Asahi’s suit against Pentech and GlaxoSmithKline for divid-
ing the market arrived in front of Posner at a moment when nei-
ther judges nor scholars had given much thought to how courts 
should treat settlements of this type under the patent and anti-
trust laws. The case was decided in 2003, near the inception of 
Posner’s interest in patent law, and before settlements of this 
type had received sustained antitrust scrutiny. The issue was 
thus ripe for Posnerian intervention. 
Posner began with first principles. He reasoned that if a pa-
tent settlement were being used as “a device for circumventing 
antitrust law[s]”—for instance, if a settlement were used to fix 
prices for a patented good—it would violate antitrust law.15 Nota-
bly, this appeared to be an issue of first impression in the courts. 
Indeed, the closest case on point—a 1926 Supreme Court case—
pointed in the opposite direction.16 (True to form, Posner declared 
that the Supreme Court’s 1926 decision was wrong and proceeded 
as if it imposed no impediment to his own decision-making.) Crit-
ically, Posner also observed that the legal analysis depended on 
the substantive merits of the patent lawsuit itself. If the patent 
had been valid and infringed, settling a lawsuit through an agree-
ment to set prices at monopoly levels would have given the patent 
owner no more or less than it was otherwise entitled to. However, 
if the patent was invalid (or not infringed), and the patent owner 
knew it was invalid, the settlement was a sham and a mere pre-
text for violating antitrust law.17 
In his focus on the strength of the patent, Posner anticipated 
the next decade of jurisprudence on antitrust and patent settle-
ments. As scholars and courts realized over the next several 
years, the question of patent strength was central to the antitrust 
 
 15 Id at 991. 
 16 See id at 992, citing United States v General Electric Co, 272 US 476 (1926). 
 17 Asahi, 289 F Supp 2d at 991–92. 
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inquiry.18 A settlement that might be appropriate if the patent 
were strong would be transformed into an antitrust violation if 
the patent were weak. Indeed, much of the debate over antitrust 
law and patent settlements over the ensuing decade centered 
around the issue of patent strength. In particular, courts and 
scholars worried that deciding the antitrust issue would require 
holding a type of shadow trial to evaluate the strength of the un-
derlying patent.19 This could be cumbersome and time-consuming, 
to the point at which the entire doctrine might become unworka-
ble. In Asahi, however, this problem did not loom large. Posner 
had already adjudicated the GlaxoSmithKline patent in the 
course of a prior litigation between SmithKline and Apotex,  
another generic drug manufacturer. There, Posner had found the 
patent valid but not infringed.20 Moreover, as Posner explained, 
“Although I did rule that Apotex had not infringed [the patent], I 
made clear that the issue was a close one. The case is now on  
appeal to the Federal Circuit, which for all that anyone can know 
may reverse.”21 Even as early as 2003, Posner understood the  
uncertainty underlying patent law and the vicissitudes of the  
Federal Circuit. 
Yet Posner’s analysis did not stop there. He also explained 
that in some cases the structure of the settlement itself can 
demonstrate that it constitutes a restraint on trade, even without 
reference to the strength of the patent. For instance, he explained, 
settlements “in which the patentee explicitly pays the alleged in-
fringer to stay out of the market, are criticized and sometimes 
invalidated on the theory that they prevent competition.”22 These 
types of agreements are called “reverse payment” settlements be-
cause the plaintiff pays the defendant to settle the case, rather 
than the reverse. The idea that reverse payments should be con-
sidered illegal had only begun to percolate in the academic liter-
ature over the previous year,23 and Posner’s opinion in Asahi was 
 
 18 See, for example, Richard MacMillan Jr, Mary Bram, and M. Brinkley Tappan, 
Solving the Procedural Quagmire for Testing Reverse Payment Settlements, 11 Minn J L 
Sci & Tech 801, 813–14 (2010). 
 19 See, for example, In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 544 F3d 
1323, 1336–37 (Fed Cir 2008); MacMillan, Bram, and Tappan, 11 Minn J L Sci & Tech at 
811–12 (cited in note 18). 
 20 Apotex, 247 F Supp 2d at 1052. 
 21 Asahi, 289 F Supp 2d at 993. 
 22 Id at 994. 
 23 See Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J Econ 391, 
394 (2003); Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis, and Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive  
Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 Minn L Rev 1719, 1749–50, 1757–59 
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only the third time the phrase “reverse payment” had made its 
way into a judicial opinion.24 In Posner’s view, the SmithKline-
Pentech settlement did not constitute a reverse payment. 
SmithKline had not paid Pentech any money to settle the case, 
and SmithKline had allowed Pentech to enter the Puerto Rico 
market, thereby increasing competition.25 Posner upheld the 
SmithKline-Pentech settlement as lawful and granted judgment 
against Asahi.26 
Judge Posner’s opinion in Asahi is a shining example of the 
many virtues that made him such an influential judge. He was 
among the first judges in America to recognize and understand a 
complex economic issue that had critical relevance to law. Rather 
than worrying about sticking strictly to the facts of his own case, 
he laid out a comprehensive economic theory of the circumstances 
under which a patent holder’s actions will or will not constitute 
violations of antitrust law. In so doing, he prefigured one of the 
most important issues to arise in patent law in decades.27 This 
line of doctrine culminated in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Federal Trade Commission v Actavis, Inc,28 in which the Court, 
following Posner, held that “unexplained large reverse pay-
ment[s]” could be unlawful under the antitrust laws.29 In Actavis, 
 
(2003); Herbert Hovenkamp, et al, IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles 
Applied to Intellectual Property Law § 31.1c at 31-8 to -9 (2002). 
 24 Judge Posner was preceded by five months by Judge David G. Trager of the  
Eastern District of New York and by a month and a half by Judge R. Lanier Anderson of 
the Eleventh Circuit. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 261 F Supp 
2d 188, 250, 252 (EDNY 2003); Valley Drug Co v Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 344 F3d 
1294, 1309 (11th Cir 2003). 
 25 See Asahi, 289 F Supp 2d at 994–95. 
 26 Id at 996. Judge Posner’s opinion in Asahi generated immediate attention, both 
positive and negative. See Jeffrey I. Shinder and Matthew L. Cantor, Rigging the System?: 
Permitting Anticompetitive Settlements, 16 Health Lawyer 31, 32 (June 2004) (criticizing 
Posner’s opinion for immunizing a “blatantly anticompetitive” agreement); Kevin D. 
McDonald, Coals to Newcastle: In Defense of Judge Posner, 16 Health Lawyer 33, 33–35 
(June 2004) (defending Posner’s opinion as being rooted in antitrust and patent law);  
Robert A. Milne and Michael J. Gallagher, Recent Activity on the Brand-Generic Drug  
Patent Settlement Front, 18 Antitrust 83, 85–86 (Spring 2004) (explaining Posner’s defense 
of reverse payments as incentives to challenge patents). 
 27 See C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and 
Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 Colum L Rev 629, 639 n 40 (2009); C. Scott 
Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design 
Problem, 81 NYU L Rev 1553, 1558–59 & n 15, 1575 (2006). 
 28 570 US 136 (2013). 
 29 Id at 157. One aspect of Judge Posner’s decision that did not age quite as well was 
his conclusion that the SmithKline-Pentech arrangement could not be fairly described as 
a reverse payment. Asahi, 289 F Supp 2d at 994. In the wake of Actavis, courts have con-
cluded that unlawful reverse payments can assume forms other than cash transfers. For 
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the Court followed Posner’s lead in relying primarily on the struc-
ture of the settlement, rather than delving into the underlying 
merits of the patent lawsuit.30 The Court recognized that holding 
a shadow patent trial in order to adjudicate the merits of the an-
titrust suit would be difficult and cumbersome, and few judges 
would be as well situated as Posner in already having adjudicated 
patent validity and infringement. Indeed, the Court said little in 
Actavis that Posner had not explained a decade earlier in Asahi. 
In the intervening decade, Posner’s decision in Asahi exerted 
an outsized influence on the courts and the law. His opinion has 
been cited more than a thousand times, including in more than 
one hundred district court opinions, ten circuit opinions, and once 
by the Supreme Court. It is not surprising that Posner made such 
an important contribution to antitrust law—his influence on that 
field is well appreciated.31 What is more surprising is that the 
reach of his decision extended to patent law, and that it came in 
the context of a district court case in which he was sitting by des-
ignation. It took the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit a 
decade to catch up with Richard Posner, district judge, but by the 
standards of those two courts, that was reasonably quick. 
 
instance, allowing a generic competitor to enter one small segment of the market, while 
reserving the remainder of the market for the patent owner, can also constitute an unlaw-
ful reverse payment. See In re Lipitor Antitrust Litigation, 868 F3d 231, 253 (3d Cir 2017); 
King Drug Co of Florence v SmithKline Beecham Corp, 791 F3d 388, 409 (3d Cir 2015) 
(finding that a “no-[authorized generic] agreement” in effect constituted a reverse pay-
ment). The plaintiff’s permission to sell in that limited market segment constitutes a form 
of payment. And the increase in competition is sufficiently minor that it does not insulate 
the overall agreement from scrutiny as a potential restraint of trade. 
 30 See Actavis, 570 US at 147–48. 
 31 See, for example, Steven C. Salop, Understanding Richard Posner on Exclusionary 
Conduct (Antitrust Source, Oct 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/TBS2-USXG. Posner’s 
influence at the intersection of patent law and antitrust was not limited to Asahi alone. 
His opinion in USM Corp v SPS Technologies, Inc, 694 F2d 505 (7th Cir 1982), is widely 
credited as having broken significant new ground in the law of antitrust and patent mis-
use. See, for example, Daryl Lim, Patent Misuse and Antitrust: Rebirth or False Dawn?, 
20 Mich Telecom & Tech L Rev 299, 330–33 (2014); Richard Calkins, Patent Law: The 
Impact of the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act and Noerr-Pennington Doctrine on Misuse 
Defenses and Antitrust Counterclaims, 38 Drake L Rev 175, 188–89 (1989). His opinion in 
Brunswick Corp v Riegel Textile Corp, 752 F2d 261 (7th Cir 1984), is similarly viewed as 
having strongly influenced the Walker Process doctrine, though it is not without critics. 
See generally Christopher R. Leslie, Monopolization through Patent Theft, 103 
Georgetown L J 47 (2014) (criticizing Posner for creating a new legal rule that effectively 
immunized patent theft from antitrust liability). 
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II.  RITCHIE V VAST RESOURCES 
Justice Antonin Scalia once remarked that he wrote his opin-
ions for casebooks, in the hope that they might be used to educate 
future generations of law students.32 Justice Scalia meant that he 
worked to make his opinions particularly clear but also acerbic 
and, when possible, funny, in the hope that casebook editors 
would select them for publication. Posner is no stranger to opin-
ions that have been republished in casebooks, in large part be-
cause his writing was also characterized by superb clarity and 
concision. But occasionally an opinion lands in a casebook for rea-
sons that have little to do with how it was crafted. For instance, a 
judge might find himself adjudicating the patentability of a sex toy. 
As any patent law student of the last decade could tell you, 
that was the subject matter of Ritchie. The patent at issue in 
Ritchie involved the use of borosilicate glass (commonly known as 
Pyrex glass) in the manufacture of sex toys.33 It turns out that the 
properties of borosilicate glass make it particularly conducive to 
use in sex toys. In particular, it can withstand heating and other 
types of rough treatment without shattering. Indeed, the inven-
tor’s borosilicate sex toys were an immediate commercial success. 
For the patent holder, the problem was that the invention did 
not seem particularly technically innovative. Glass sex toys 
(made from other types of glass) had existed for decades; borosil-
icate glass had existed for decades. How much ingenuity could 
have been required to combine them? This question implicates 
the law of patent obviousness. Just because an invention is “new,” 
in the sense that it has never before existed, does not mean that 
it is patentable. The invention must also be nonobvious, in the 
sense that a person of “ordinary skill in the art”34 would not have 
known how to create it, given the state of technology in the field.35 
The law of nonobviousness is particularly salient when an inven-
tion is (merely) the combination of two or more previously existing 
inventions. The question then is whether a person of ordinary 
skill in the art would have known to combine those existing in-
ventions into the new technology. If so, the new invention is obvi-
ous and thus unpatentable. 
 
 32 Ralph A. Rossum, Antonin Scalia’s Jurisprudence: Text and Tradition 205  
(Kansas 2006) (“He has confessed that he writes with the verve and panache he does in 
part to ensure that his opinions are included in constitutional law casebooks.”). 
 33 Ritchie, 563 F3d at 1336. 
 34 35 USC § 103. 
 35 Ritchie, 563 F3d at 1337. 
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At the same time, courts are also required to look to what are 
referred to as the “secondary considerations” of nonobviousness—
a set of economic proxies meant to provide objective indications 
as to whether the invention was patentable.36 In particular, courts 
must assess whether the invention was commercially successful, 
particularly if it addressed a long-existing consumer need. If con-
sumer demand for this type of product had existed for a long time, 
no product had appeared, and then finally the patentee had pro-
duced the invention in question to substantial commercial suc-
cess, that indicates that the invention was most likely not obvious 
to produce and should be patentable. 
These two types of considerations—technical and economic—
are both crucial to the inquiry into whether an invention is non-
obvious and thus patentable. The problem for Posner in Ritchie 
was that they pointed in opposite directions. On the one hand, 
both glass sex toys and borosilicate glass were decades old; how 
hard could it have been to invent the idea of combining them? On 
the other hand, if this invention were so obvious, and if the prod-
uct were so successful, why hadn’t someone else invented this sex 
toy in the intervening decades? Why had it taken so long? Worse 
still, there was no doctrine describing how to weigh technical and 
economic considerations against one another when they yield op-
posite results. Economic considerations are officially denoted as 
“secondary,” but that had not stopped some courts from privileg-
ing them, while others had relied more heavily on the technical 
considerations.37 Ritchie threw the lack of guidance on what 
would seem like a critical issue into stark relief. 
To the surprise of many observers, Posner sided with the 
technical considerations and held the invention unpatentable. 
First, he noted astutely that economic indicators can sometimes 
be an unreliable guide to patentability: “The commercial success 
of a product can have many causes unrelated to patentable inven-
tiveness; for example, the commercial success of an ‘invention’ 
might be due not to the invention itself but to skillful marketing 
of the product embodying the invention.”38 Instead, Posner ex-
 
 36 See Ritchie, 563 at 1336; Graham v John Deere Co, 383 US 1, 17–18 (1966);  
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2141.II (US Patent and Trademark Office 9th 
ed 2014). 
 37 See, for example, UCB, Inc v Accord Healthcare, Inc, 201 F Supp 3d 491, 527, 540 
(D Del 2016) (“[S]econdary considerations may often be the most probative and cogent 
evidence in the record relating to obviousness.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 38 Ritchie, 563 F3d at 1336. 
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plained, judges should rely more heavily on the technical ap-
proach to obviousness, particularly in cases such as this one in 
which the invention is a combination of preexisting elements. 
There could be other explanations for why this invention was not 
produced in the intervening decades and nonetheless became 
commercially successful, but the technological point could not be 
denied. It is appropriate, concluded Posner, that economic consid-
erations be treated as “secondary,” with the technical analysis as 
the primary focus.39 
For a judge so steeped in economic thinking to reject an eco-
nomic approach to the law of obviousness was a shock to the pa-
tent world, and one that has had lasting reverberations. Since 
Posner’s decision in Ritchie, courts have moved further away from 
using economics to adjudicate obviousness and toward the tech-
nical approach as the dominant methodology.40 That the law 
would take this turn was by no means a certainty. For instance, 
the leading patent law casebook notes that objective economic 
considerations of obviousness initially took on a greater role in 
patent law in the wake of a 2007 Supreme Court decision making 
it easier to declare an invention obvious.41 That trend did not con-
tinue after Ritchie, however. Courts have returned the economic 
considerations to secondary standing, and it is now much more 
common to find cases in which the court’s technical analysis over-
whelms any separate economic argument.42 It is remarkable that 
when Posner promotes the role of economics in law, other courts 
listen. And it is equally remarkable that when Posner diminishes 
the role of economics in law, other courts listen just as closely. 
 
 39 Id at 1336. 
 40 See, for example, Geo M. Martin Co v Alliance Machine Systems International 
LLC, 618 F3d 1294, 1304–06 (Fed Cir 2010). 
 41 See Merges and Duffy, Patent Law and Policy at 684 (cited in note 4), citing KSR 
International Co v Teleflex Inc, 550 US 398 (2007). 
 42 See ZUP, LLC v Nash Manufacturing, Inc, 896 F3d 1365, 1372–75 (Fed Cir 2018); 
Intercontinental Great Brands LLC v Kellogg North America Co, 869 F3d 1336, 1345–47 
(Fed Cir 2017); Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp v Hospira, Inc, 874 F3d 724, 730–31 (Fed Cir 
2017); In re Depomed, Inc, 680 Fed Appx 947, 951–52 (Fed Cir 2017); American Innotek, 
Inc v United States, 128 Fed Cl 135, 163–67 (2016); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Teva  
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc, 752 F3d 967, 978–79 (Fed Cir 2014); Galderma Laboratories, 
LP v Tolmar, Inc, 737 F3d 731, 740–41 (Fed Cir 2013); Wm. Wrigley Jr Co v Cadbury 
Adams USA LLC, 683 F3d 1356, 1363–65 (Fed Cir 2012); In re Huai-Hung Kao, 639 F3d 
1057, 1073–74 (Fed Cir 2011). 
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III.  APPLE V MOTOROLA 
Finally, Posner’s impact on patent law is visible even in the 
most unlikely of places: a case in which he was eventually over-
turned by the court of appeals. The case is Apple v Motorola, 
which Posner decided over the course of a series of opinions in 
2012.43 That case stemmed from a series of suits and countersuits 
brought by Apple and Motorola Mobility against one another as 
part of a long-running battle—also including Samsung and 
Google, which had purchased Motorola—that became known as 
the “smartphone wars.”44 At issue were a variety of software and 
hardware patents that cover what now seem like basic features of 
smartphones and tablets. This included software design features 
such as the toolbar on iPhones, software protocols for streaming 
audio and video smoothly and without glitches, and technology 
that allowed cell phones to communicate with cellular base sta-
tions.45 Apple and Motorola (really, Google) were suing and coun-
tersuing one another for hundreds of millions of dollars. 
In a series of opinions that made national headlines, Posner 
barred the testimony of both sides’ damages experts, holding that 
their methods for estimating patent damages were unscientific 
and unsound.46 He then threw out the case because neither party 
could prove damages, and thus neither party had any grounds for 
obtaining relief.47 The case garnered immediate national atten-
tion, with some commentators praising Posner for calling atten-
tion to the flaws in patent damages calculations48 and others vili-
fying him for contravening what had seemed like settled circuit 
 
 43 Apple Inc v Motorola, Inc, 2012 WL 12065655 (ND Ill) (granting Apple’s motion for 
summary judgment of noninfringement); Apple Inc v Motorola, Inc, 2012 WL 12014907 
(ND Ill) (issuing order regarding expert testimony); Apple Inc v Motorola, Inc, 2012 WL 
12537293 (ND Ill) (adopting claims constructions); 2012 WL 1959560 (ND Ill) (rejecting 
all damages testimony); Apple, 869 F Supp 2d 901 (ND Ill 2012) (dismissing the case). 
 44 See Fred Vogelstein, Apple vs Google: Did Apple Learn Anything from Its War 
with Microsoft? (Wired, Nov 1, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/HRV4-4VGR.  
 45 See Apple, 2012 WL 1959560 at *2–11. 
 46 See id at *4–12. 
 47 Apple, 869 F Supp 2d at 923–24. 
 48 See, for example, Cheryl Milone, Apple v. Motorola: Analyzing Judge Posner’s De-
cision (IP Watch Dog, Aug 12, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/VU3N-L8YL (explaining 
Posner’s economic philosophy as it relates to patents and analyzing the importance of ob-
jective damages evidence); Tim Worstall, Judge Posner Dismisses with Prejudice the Apple 
Motorola Patents Case (Forbes, June 24, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/V5DA-3QAX 
(praising the opinion as a sign that the “patent system will not be used to smother inno-
vation any more”); Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Why Judge Posner Pulled the Plug on Apple v. 
Motorola (Fortune, June 23, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/KEU6-PGKM (summariz-
ing Judge Posner’s findings in the case and praising their clarity). 
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precedent.49 Indeed, the Federal Circuit unceremoniously re-
versed Posner’s decision just a few months later.50 The appellate 
judge learned that sitting by designation on a district court has 
its downsides. Because Posner’s opinion did not last, Apple v 
Motorola might seem like an odd candidate in which to look for 
Judge Posner’s influence on the law. 
And yet his Apple v Motorola opinion, and the general atti-
tude toward patent cases that it signaled, has turned out to be 
just as significant in death as it was in life. For years, scholars 
and commentators had been arguing that patents had become too 
economically powerful and that patent owners were using law-
suits to impede genuine innovation in a manner that harmed con-
sumers.51 The Supreme Court had offered occasional indications 
that it understood the problem and, in a series of decisions, had 
taken modest steps to curb the number and strength of patents.52 
But the Federal Circuit had continued to resist this trend and 
even went so far as to push back against the Supreme Court’s 
decision.53 When Posner decided Apple v Motorola, patents re-
mained nearly as powerful and plentiful as they had ever been. 
Public and elite judicial opinion remained largely split regarding 
whether the patent system needed correction. 
Posner’s opinion in Apple v Motorola represented an inflec-
tion point in this debate. Not for legal reasons; as I noted, the case 
was overturned by the Federal Circuit. Many observers, even gen-
erally sympathetic ones, were largely unpersuaded by Posner’s 
 
 49 Doll and Denbina, 21 Tex Intell Prop L J at 320–31 (cited in note 9) (explaining 
that Posner went against established precedent and created a regime that was too harsh 
and not economically efficient); Richard A. Epstein, Richard Posner Gets It Wrong (Hoover 
Institution, July 31, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/GN6Y-WEJU (arguing that  
Posner’s opinion was “extraordinary,” would jeopardize any software patent dispute, and was 
based on a misguided view that patent proliferation is a problem that needs remedying). 
 50 Apple v Motorola, 757 F3d at 1330. 
 51 See, for example, Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 Yale L J 470, 477–82 
(2011); Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va L Rev 1575, 
1629–30 (2003). 
 52 See, for example, eBay Inc v MercExchange, LLC, 547 US 388, 392–94 (2006) (rec-
ognizing a stricter test for issuing permanent injunctions against patent infringement); 
KSR International Co v Teleflex Inc, 550 US 398, 419–22 (2007) (establishing that obvi-
ousness can be shown in more ways than just the teaching, suggestion, or motivation 
(TSM) test). 
 53 See, for example, Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc v Mylan Laboratories, Inc, 
520 F3d 1358, 1364 (Fed Cir 2008) (reading the Supreme Court’s rejection of the TSM test 
in KSR very narrowly); Black & Decker, Inc v Robert Bosch Tool Corp, 260 Fed Appx 284, 
290 (Fed Cir 2008) (same); Takeda Chemical Industries, Ltd v Alphapharm Pty, Ltd, 492 
F3d 1350, 1356–57 (Fed Cir 2007) (same). 
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analysis of the damages issue. Rather, the opinion was remarka-
ble and significant for the statement it made about the state of 
patent law. Posner argued, more explicitly than any other federal 
judge ever had, that the courts had gone too far in expanding the 
powers of patent owners. Posner’s focus in his opinions was the 
law of damages and the manner in which he believed patent own-
ers had been allowed to collect damages on the basis of specula-
tion and guesswork. But this issue stood in for a broader array of 
patent law criticisms. His opinion was understood as a more gen-
eral strike against what Posner perceived to be a patent system 
run amok and in need of reining in. To be sure, lawyers and aca-
demics had been making similar arguments for years. But those 
types of voices are sometimes easy to ignore, particularly for the 
federal judiciary. 
Posner’s opinion was very different. For a sitting judge to levy 
such a direct assault on the patent system, and for the attack to 
come from a judge with such impeccable economic credentials as 
Posner, was a development that could not be ignored.54 Posner’s 
voice not only amplified the growing scholarly consensus that pa-
tents had become too powerful, it helped that scholarly consensus 
traverse the vast expanse between scholarly opinion and judicial 
opinion. It is always difficult to ascribe causation within an intel-
lectual movement. Posner’s opinion was not widely cited, in part 
because it was soon reversed. Nonetheless, his opinion in Apple v 
Motorola marked the moment at which the tide appeared to turn 
against patent holders on a number of different fronts. 
First, and most directly, the Federal Circuit began issuing a 
series of decisions that raised the hurdles to patent holders seek-
ing damages. The Federal Circuit limited the circumstances un-
der which victorious patent plaintiffs could obtain damages based 
on the “entire market value” of the product being sold by the de-
fendant, which was often a route to large damages awards.55 That 
court also began issuing decisions in which it blocked plaintiffs 
 
 54 The timing was also auspicious. Posner’s decision in Apple v Motorola came just 
three months after the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v  
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc, 566 US 66 (2012), a case on patentable subject matter 
(which actually received substantially less attention than Posner’s opinion). 
 55 See, for example, VirnetX, Inc v Cisco Systems, Inc, 767 F3d 1308, 1326 (Fed Cir 
2014) (finding that a patentee cannot assess damages based on the entire market value of 
an accused product if the patented feature did not create the basis for consumer demand); 
LaserDynamics, Inc v Quanta Computer, Inc, 694 F3d 51, 67 (2012) (explaining that “the 
entire market value rule acts as a check” to ensure that damages are reasonable and based 
on sound economic and factual hypotheses). 
1184 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:1171 
	
from relying on what appeared to be abnormally large licensing 
fees as a guide to damages.56 And perhaps most notably, the  
Federal Circuit also began to issue a growing number of decisions 
in which it rejected a patentee’s theory of damages as “specula-
tive” or unproven, precisely the grounds on which Posner had re-
jected Apple and Motorola’s cases.57 Even the Supreme Court got 
into the act on the question of damages—in its case, damages for 
design patents. At the time of Posner’s decision, existing law pro-
vided that a design patent holder could obtain damages based on 
the entire value of the product that incorporated the patented de-
sign, even if much of the product had nothing to do with that de-
sign. In Samsung Electronics Co v Apple Inc,58 a case that, like 
Posner’s Apple v Motorola, was part of the greater smartphone 
wars, the Supreme Court eliminated this practice. The Court held 
that damages for design patents for multicomponent products 
should generally be apportioned—that is, patentees were permit-
ted to obtain damages only for the portion of the product that was 
actually covered by the patented design.59 This represented a ma-
jor step backward for design patent plaintiffs seeking outsized 
awards. 
Indeed, Posner’s decision marked a turning point for the  
Supreme Court’s treatment of patents more generally. Over the 
next several years, the Court issued a series of 9–0 decisions that 
cut back on the power and scope of patents more decisively than 
any case in decades (if not longer). In particular, it dramatically 
narrowed the circumstances under which inventors could obtain 
patents on software and business methods, as well as naturally 
occurring substances such as human DNA.60 These decisions had 
the effect of invalidating tens or hundreds of thousands of existing 
patents. Some of these patents overlapped with the technologies 
at suit in Apple v Motorola, patents whose economic worth Judge 
 
 56 See Finjan, Inc v Blue Coat Systems, Inc, 879 F3d 1299, 1312 (Fed Cir 2018);  
LaserDynamics, 694 F3d at 81.  
 57 See, for example, Exmark Manufacturing Co v Briggs & Stratton Power Products 
Group, LLC, 879 F3d 1332, 1352 (Fed Cir 2018); VirnetX, 767 F3d at 1331–34; Power  
Integrations, Inc v Fairchild Semiconductor International, Inc, 711 F3d 1348, 1372–74 
(Fed Cir 2013); Whitserve, LLC v Computer Packages, Inc, 694 F3d 10, 29–30 (Fed Cir 
2012); LaserDynamics, 694 F3d at 81. 
 58 137 S Ct 429 (2016). 
 59 Id at 435–36. 
 60 See Alice Corp v CLS Bank International, 573 US 208, 226–27 (2014); Association 
for Molecular Pathology v Myriad Genetics, Inc, 569 US 576, 596 (2013). 
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Posner had called into question. When the dust from these deci-
sions cleared, the world of patents looked much more like Judge 
Posner might have envisioned it: patents on software and related 
technologies, which many people believed were not increasing in-
novation, had been wiped from the board. 
It is difficult to determine causality in legal change under 
even the best of circumstances. Whatever judges might say in 
their opinions, one can never be sure what is driving either their 
reasoning or the outcome. Here, of course, the causal connection 
is even more remote, particularly as it concerns the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in the cases on patentability. It is impossible to 
know for certain whether the Supreme Court justices were even 
aware of Posner’s opinions in Apple v Motorola, much less influ-
enced by them. Nevertheless, the timing is unmistakable. June 
2012 is when criticism of the patent system writ large migrated 
from the academy to the judiciary—when it crossed the law’s ver-
sion of the blood-brain barrier. Once Judge Posner began to de-
scribe the ills of the patent system, the tide seemed to turn deci-
sively against the advocates of ever-stronger patents. The result 
was a series of decisions that struck back against the least eco-
nomically justified types of patent rights. At minimum, the out-
come is what Posner would have called for. But more than that, if 
one looks hard, his intellectual fingerprints are visible all over it. 
CONCLUSION 
For most circuit judges, influence is based on the fact that a 
court of appeals is, for the most part, a court of last resort. The 
Supreme Court grants certiorari very rarely, and thus the word 
of even a typical court of appeals judge is often the last. For  
Posner, influence extended well beyond this brute institutional 
fact. In many areas of law discussed in this Symposium, his opin-
ions as appellate judge succeeded in convincing the judges of 
other circuits, and in some cases the Supreme Court as well, and 
became the law of the land through sheer persuasiveness. In 
other cases, the Seventh Circuit had diversity jurisdiction over 
cases arising out of Illinois, Indiana, or Wisconsin state law.  
Posner’s judgments were, as a formal matter, subordinate to the 
judgments of the state supreme courts. Yet as this Symposium 
describes, there are many areas of state law as well in which 
Judge Posner has been tremendously influential, simply as a mat-
ter of the persuasive power of his opinions. 
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In patent law, the deck was stacked against Judge Posner 
even more firmly. When he heard patent cases (other than 
Ritchie), he was acting as a district court judge. Above him sat a 
court of appeals, the Federal Circuit, that had been designed to 
be expert in patent law and is not shy about asserting its appel-
late prerogative. And, of course, above the Federal Circuit sits the 
Supreme Court. The odds of a district court judge having any sig-
nificant influence on patent law are very, very slim. 
And yet Posner’s influence has been profound. Indeed, he has 
had a greater influence on patent law than any district judge 
since Learned Hand, a century earlier.61 That influence was ex-
erted through typically Posnerian channels. Finding patent law 
largely bereft of sound economic analysis, Posner set about eluci-
dating how patent law ought to function from a law-and- 
economics perspective and pointing out the areas in which it had 
clearly gone awry. In some cases, patent law was insufficiently 
attentive to relevant economic considerations; in at least one 
other (Ritchie), patent law was perhaps too in thrall to economics. 
In each instance, Judge Posner brought to the field a clarity of 
thought and a sharpness of analysis that had previously been 
lacking. 
Judge Richard Posner became involved in patent law only be-
cause he wanted to be—because he found the subject interesting 
enough to begin taking patent cases while sitting by designation. 
In contrast to his influence on other fields, there was nothing in-
evitable or even probable about his contributions to this area of 
law. Judge Posner on patent law is thus a happy accident of his-
tory, one from which the lawyers who practice patent law, the 
judges who hear patent cases, the scholars who write about the 
field, and the public at large—not to mention the law itself—will 
continue to benefit for years to come. 
 
 61 See Parke-Davis & Co v H.K. Mulford & Co, 189 F 95, 114–15 (SDNY 1911) (hold-
ing that purified natural products were patentable). Judge Hand’s opinion in Parke-Davis 
operated as governing law for one hundred years until it was implicitly overruled by the 
Supreme Court in Myriad. On the basis of Parke-Davis, applicants were granted patents 
on a wide variety of biotechnical innovations, up to and including patents on human genes. 
Judge Hand also exerted significant influence as a Second Circuit judge, before the crea-
tion of the Federal Circuit, when the regional circuits heard patent cases. See, for example, 
Metallizing Engineering Co v Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co, 153 F2d 516, 520 (2d Cir 
1946); Gillman v Stern, 114 F2d 28, 31 (2d Cir 1940) (finding that a “puffing machine” 
could not serve as prior art against a patent application if it was kept completely secret). 
